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EDITORIAL NOTE
ELECTION OF CAUSES OR GROUNDS OF ACTION IN A
DUPLICITOUS DECLARATION
In a recent West Virginia case,' the Supreme Court of Appeals, by way of dictum,' suggests that, when two or more grounds
for recovery are alleged in a single count of a declaration, the
plaintiff may be compelled to elect a single ground upon which
he will rely at the trial. Since this seems to be the first West
Virginia case in which such a procedure is prescribed, and the
court states no reason to sustain it other than the fact that, under
the local statutes, the fault of duplicity can no longer be reached
by demurrer, it may be profitable to inquire into the authorities
and reasoning upon which the proposition may be based. Before
'Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 171 S. E. 757 (W. Va. 1933).
2The action was for death by wrongful act. In a single count, the death
was alleged to have been caused (1) by negligence of the defendant and (2)
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undertaking to evaluate the single authority' cited by the court,
and other authorities which might be taken as sustaining the
court's suggestion, it will be advisable to advert to some general
distinctions and differentiations.
Strictly, the fault of duplicity consists in stating in a single
pleading (count, plea, replication, etc.) more than one ground
as bases for a single recovery or a single defense; but the term
has also been used to designate the situation where more causes
of action than one or more defenses than one are alleged in a single pleading. If the allegations involve no other violation of the
rules of pleading than mere duplicity, then the fault is purely a
formal one and can be reached only by a special demurrer. HRowever, the same allegations which give rise to duplicity may at the
same time violate other rules of pleading. Thus, there may be
united in a single count of a declaration causes of action which
could not be joined in separate counts. In such a case, there is
not only duplicity (so called), but also a misjoinder of causes of
action,' and the latter fault, although cured by the statute of
jeofails after verdict, is nevertheless subject- to a general demurrer. Upon demurrer to such a count, the plaintiff, to save
his declaration, would be compelled to elect, not to cure the duplicity, but to eliminate the misjoinder.' Again, where the original
common-law rule requiring singleness of issue is still in force to
the extent that only one replication can be pleaded to a single
plea, or only one rejoinder to a single replication, etc., two wholly
separate matters in a single replication or rejoinder will give rise
to what is called duplicity, but the pleading is bad also for the
by the willful act and deliberate intention of its servant. The defendant
filed pleas relying upon compliance with the' Workmen's Compensation Act.
The case was tried on issues made up on these pleas. The plaintiff was not
asked to elect and the trial court treated the pleas as presenting defenses
to both grounds for recovery. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
pleas presented no defense to the ground for recovery based on willfulness,
but permitted a general verdict for the defendant to stand as to the ground
based on negligence. A new trial was ordered as to the willful act alleged,
the court suggesting that the defendant might have compelled the plaintiff
to elect before the trial, in which event the pleas would have presented a
complete defense or no defense at all depending upon which ground the
plaintiff should have elected.
aMorriss v. White 146 Va. 553, 131 S. E. 835 (1926).
"Knotts v. McGregor, 47 W. Va. 566, 35 S. E. 899 (1900); Grass v. Big
Creek Development Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S. E. 750, L. R. A. 1915E 1057
(1915); Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of Reedsville v. Kingwood National
Bank, 85 W. Va. 371, 101 S. E. 734 (1920).
'Knotts v. McGregor, supra n. 4; Malsby v. Lanark Fuel Co., 55 W. Va.
484, 47 S.E. 359 (1904).
6Knotts v. McGregor, supra n. 4.
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other reason - that the plaintiff is entitled to reply or the defendant to rejoin only once - and an election may be compelled,
lut not on the ground of duplicity.' An unfortunate circumstance
that often exists in such cases is that, duplicity being present with
the other fault and resting upon the same allegations, its name is
lent to the other fault, although the facts and circumstances of
the case and the reasoning of the court usually clearly indicate
that the decision and its consequences axe not actually predicated
on the ground of duplicity.8
The single Virginia case' cited by the court to support its
proposition is hardly sufficient for the purpose. In the Virginia
case, the trial court compelled the plaintiff, over his objection and
exception, to elect between what it considered two separate causes
of action stated in a single count. In the appellate court, the
plaintiff urged that the trial court committed error in compelling
the election. The appellate court decided that the declaration in
fact contained only one cause of action (the defendant and the
trial court having mistaken a collateral allegation as a statement
of an independent cause of action) and hence was not duplicitos;
that the plaintiff, through his supposed election, had selected and
relied upon the true cause of action alleged; and hence that no
error had been committed in compelling the supposed election. The
court made no attempt to decide that, if (as claimed by the defendant) two separate causes of action had been alleged in the
single count, the plaintiff should have been compelled to elect.
What is said in the case as to the attempt by the plaintiff to reply
more than one matter to a single plea, for reasons stated above,
should be carefully differentiated from what is decided with
reference to the declaration.
Seemingly, the defendant in the Virginia case cited could
discover only two authorities to cite in support- of his contention
that the plaintiff should be compelled to elect. These two authorities are an earlier Virginia case and BuRKs, PLEADING AND
PRACTIcE..m
The earlier Virginia case deals with election where
the plaintiff attempted to reply more than one matter to a single
plea and hence is not in point. The same case is cited by Burks
7Chesapeake
& Ohio By. Co. v. Rison, 99 Va. 18, 37 S. E. 320 (1900);
Morriss v. White, supra n. 3.
'Idem. A similar situation might arise in West Virginia as to rejoinders,
surrejoinders, etc., the statute permitting multiple pleadings not applying
beyond the replication stage.
'DSupran. 3.
"Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Rison, supra n. 7.

2d ed. 327; 1st ed. 335.
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as authority for the procedure when the plaintiff attempts to indulge in a double replication; but as to duplicity in a declaration,
Burks makes the following statement:
"In Virginia it has been held that duplicity in a declaration
is a defect of form only, and cannot be taken advantage of
by a general demurrer; and it is doubtful if the vice can be
reached at all. If it can be, it is probably by a motion to
compel the plaintiff to elect on which cause of action he will
proceed.'
.
Burks cites no authority to indicate the possibility of compelling
an election and, if he concedes the possibility, seems to be of the
opinion that an election cannot be compelled. Professor Minor,
speaking of duplicity, says: ".. . . It would appear that the objection cannot be taken advantage of in Virginia at all, except as
to dilatory pleas."' The West Virginia Court has said, "Duplicity in a; plea is no longer ground of demurrer or objection to it.'"
In a later West Virginia case,' it is said that the only remedy
open to a defendant when confronted with duplicity in a declaration is resort to the statute which permits him to demand a bill
of particulars. The weight of authority in other states, independently of statutory regulation, seems to be that, where duplicity
in a declaration is no longer subject to a demurrer and there is
no inconsistency in the allegations, no objection can be raised and
an election cannot be demanded."8
It is common knowledge that the practice of permitting multiple counts for the purpose of stating the same cause of action
in different aspects in order to meet the exigencies of proof was
designed in order to escape the fault of duplicity. Where a resort
is had to multiple counts, of course an election between the counts
is not required. Such a requirement would wholly defeat the object of the right to resort to multiple counts. Hence it must be
reasoned that, if a single count employed for such a purpose is
faulty because of duplicity, the objection must be based, not on
the ground that the plaintiff should be prohibited from alleging
more than one ground of recovery, but solely on the ground that
12

Idem., 326.

4 MINOR, INSTITUES, 939.
' Poling v. Maddox, 41 W. Va. 779, 24 S. E. 999 (1896).
Grass v. Big Creek Development Co., supra n. 4.
49 0. 5. 743-4 and cases cited. In some of these cases, as in the principal
case, the duplicity resulted from allegations of negligence and of willfulness
in the same count.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss3/6

4

Carlin: Election of Causes or Grounds of Action in a Duplicitous Declarat
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
he has alleged them in an improper form. Hence it would seem
that a statute which merely abolishes the common-law method of
objecting to this matter of form does not contemplate any substituted method of objection by means of which a plaintiff may be
compelled to suffer curtailment of the substance of his allegations.
The abolishment of form is usually intended merely to clear the
way to substance, not to expose it to new methods of attack.
Abolition of the demurrer going to duplicity in a declaration must
have been intended for the benefit of the plaintiff and not of the defendant. Yet if, as a consequence of abolishing the demurrer in
this respect, the defendant is allowed the substituted right of compelling the plaintiff to elect one ground of recovery to the exclusion of one or more others, the plaintiff may be in a worse position than if a demurrer were sustained to his count. Unless the
plaintiff should always be given, as alternative to election, the
right to amend by way of substituting multiple counts for his
single duplicitous count, he would be deprived of all his grounds
for recovery except one. Presumably a court would rarely, if ever,
oppose its discretion to such an application to amend if a demurrer were sustained to a duplicitous count. However, if the
defendant is given the power to compel an amendment as alternative to election, then he is in a position to compel the plaintiff
to suffer all the substantial consequences of a demurrer to the
duplicitous count and the statute abolishing demurrers on the
ground of duplicity has accomplished substantially nothing.
One can very easily agree with Professor Minor"7 to the effect
that it is unfortunate that the statutes have left the courts powerless to cope with the evils of duplicity. It is one thing to indulge
in generalities about eliminating objections as to formal tecbnicalities, but it is an entirely different thing when a trial court is
confronted with the task of determining what cause, or how many
causes, of action are stated in the jumbled allegations of a single
count when the difficulty could easily have been avoided and the
issues clearly defined by a resort to multiple counts." It will be
noted that the fault of duplicity may still be carried to such an
extreme that a demurrer may perhaps be sustained to a declaration, not because of the duplicity, but because the attempt to indulge in duplicity has led to such uncertainty in the declaration
174 Miuyon, INSTITUTES, 620-621, 939.
IThe declaration in the principal case seemingly was not subject to the
criticism of uncertainty. The two grounds were so clearly separable in the
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that the court cannot determine what cause of action is intended
to be stated. In such a case, the ground of demurrer would be
uncertainty in the declaration. Short of this extreme, the only
resort seems to be to demand a bill of particulars stating more
definitely the grounds of the plaintiff's claim or claims.'
-LEO

CAr N.

allegations that the court could permit the verdict to stand as to one ground
and order a new trial confined to the other ground.
"Gould v. Coal & Coke Ry. Co., 74 W. Va. 8, 81 S. E. 529 (1914).
Grass v. Big Creek Development Co., supra n. 15.
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